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The Commandeering of Free Will:
Brainwashing as a Legitimate Defense
Ida-Gaye Warburton*
.IM7Idd
Imagine that your teenage daughter is dragged from her apartment in the
middle of the night while wearing only panties and a bathrobe.' Screaming, she
is forced into the trunk of a waiting car.2 Though her screams attract the atten-
tion of her neighbors, they are unable to help as they are driven back into their
homes by the kidnappers' gunfire.3 Terrified, she is imprisoned, bound and
blindfolded in a closet for fifty-seven days, and subjected to mental and physical
cruelty and torture.4
This nightmare was the actual fate of Patricia Hearst ("Hearst"), who was
kidnapped on February 4, 1974, by a group that identified itself as the
Symbionese Liberation Army ("SLA). s Two months after her kidnapping, to
the disbelief of her family and friends, Hearst "announced in a taped message
that she had repudiated her former lifestyle and was determined to 'stay and
fight' beside her captors."6 Not long afterwards, Hearst, wielding a sawed-off
carbine, participated in the armed robbery of a bank; three bystanders were
wounded.7 A shoplifting incident followed in which she riddled a sporting goods
store with rounds from an automatic weapon.'
* JD. Candidate, May 2004, Washington and Lee UniversitySchool of Law B.S., Bernard
At Baruch College, The Cty University of New York. I would like to express my gratitude to
Professor Roger D. Groot, the students in the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse- especially
Philip Yoon and Janice Kopec- for their patience and support, and my family and friends. This
article is dedicated to my many mothers. I am able to be me because of you all.
1. Patty-earst Online, 7he*Gta 4, athttpiJ/www.claykeckcom/patty/kidnap.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Patty Hearst Online, 7he A7ipbi1 (describing the
kidnapping and captivity of Patricia Hearst).
2. Idat 4.
3. Id
4. Id at 9.
5. Id at 1, 7.
6. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068,1071 (ND. CaL. 1978). Hearst was sentenced
to seven years for armed bank robbery. Id at 1072. At trial, she argued she was coerced by
members of the SLA into participating in the bank robberies. Id at 1071.
7. Id at 1071.
8. Id
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Hearst's subsequent prosecution for bank robberyin UnitedStat v Hatsz?
propelled the defense of brainwashing into the spotlight and courtroom 0
Hearst's transformation from heiress to gun-toting, radical bank robber seemed
inexplicable. At trial, however, Hearst alleged that she did not intend to partici-
pate in the bank robbery but did so only under the threat of bodily harm."
According to Dr. William Sargant, an English psychologist who interviewed
Hearst before her trial, "[Thirty] days being blindfolded is the maximum a person
can take before a 'breakdown' occurs, after which the'brain goes into an 'inhibi-
tory' reverse. " 2 Essentially, "through an unrelenting campaign of mental cruelty,
sensory deprivation, malnutrition, threats of death and injury, and the constant
confusion of affection and abuse [Hearst] was broken. She receded into herself,
shut off her feelings and emotions, and did what she was told."" Hearst had
been brainwashed. By the end of her trial, however, Hearst went from kidnap-
ping victim to convicted felon. 4 The brainwashing defense failed.
Since HamAt, brainwashing as a defense, though not formalized, has been
permitted primarily in civil cases dealing with new religions or cults.'" Propo-
nents of the defense suggest that an individual laboring under the condition
should be exculpated completely for any crime he or she commits. 6 Theorists
contend that the offending individual is not acting of his or her own free will and
should not be held responsible for the beliefs forced upon him or her by an-
9. 466 F. Supp. 1068 (ND. Cal. 1978).
10. See Hamt, 466 F. Supp. at 1071. The issue of whether or not Hearst had the requisite
intent to commit the crime was the sole issue of fact at trial. Id The available case history does not
elaborate on the defense's use of the brainwashing theory because the issue was not raised on
appeal. However, the defense proffered evidence to establish that members of the SLA coerced
Hearst to participate in the crimes. Id The suggestion was that her participation, though contrary
to her own assertions of joining the SLA, was not willing. Id
11. Id
12. Patty Hearst Online, The rWa4 20, at http://www.claykeckcom/patty/triaLhtm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003) (hereinafter Patty Hearst, The Tial] (outlining critical aspects of the trial and
its participants).
13. Patty Hearst Online, 7Ye Ki spa note 1, at 16.
14. Heanst, 466 F. Supp. at 1072.
15. See, eg., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P2d
46, 54 (Cal. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff argued the church engaged in brainwashing to induce
members to join the church which constituted, ier alia, fraud and emotional distress); Tuman v.
Genesis Assocs., 894 F. Supp. 183, 185 (ED. Pa. 1995) (noting that plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were liable for implanting false memories into the plaintiff trugh the use of brain-
washing). Swe r Ann Penners Wrosch, UnwrrheI r, Intwh ySe i& Bnsiwgbih A
More Carit, Im ts.aadAppmid, 25 Loy. LA L. REv. 499,501 (1992) (comparing the legal
theories of undue influence, involuntary servitude and brainwashing within the context of religious
cults).
16. See Richard Delgado, Asaipn cf Cinr1 Stas qf Mind- Tozwda Dfme 7hemyfor dx
CrewPeai(-Br=Lhda-) Dqer]r, iznJ icATIONADExoasE iNME QuNALLAw,
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 467,486 (Nichael Louis Corrado ed., 1994) (analyzing the viability of
the coerced defendant defense, particularly the criticisms that the defense would have no clearly
defined boundaries within the justice system).
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other. 7 A criminal defendant who has succumbed to brainwashing could not be
held to ultimate accountability without offending the foundations of the legal
system."
Before brainwashing can become a doctrinally acceptable criminal defense,
it must be narrowly defined to complement current legal principles. The
defensive postures of duress and battered woman syndrome ("BWS") offer
brainwashing some hope of future acceptance. All three principles endeavor to
weigh the actions of a coerced actor against society's need for retribution. A
coerced actor who pleads any of these defenses intended the consequences of
his actions.19 If the intent to commit the crime, however, is superimposed by
another person, the actor is less culpable than an actor who is able fully to
exercise his or her free will.2 Fairness dictates that brainwashing mitigates the
culpability and ultimately the punishment of a person who was brainwashed at
the time the crime was committed. Complete exculpation, however, goes too
far. Brainwashing, as a defense, was unsuccessful in Heart for this apparent
reason.2' Such a result- complete exculpation for a crime committed know-
ingly- goes against the grain of our legal system. A compromise is necessary
and one is apparentlyforthcoming.22 The cases of John Walker Lindh ("Lindh")
and Lee Boyd Malvo ("Malvo") will be telling in this regard.3
This article proposes that brainwashing should be recognized as a defensive
posture, similar to duress or BWS, in the unique case of capital murder. In Part
II, this article discusses the origins of brainwashing and its development in the
scientific community and legal system. Part III of this article examines the
analytical similarities between brainwashing and the doctrinally acceptable
defenses of duress and BWS. Part IV outlines the application of the defense in
a capital case and the future of brainwashing.
17. Id at 471.
18. Id at 470.
19. Id at 471.
20. Id at 476-77.
21. SeeHem, 466 F. Supp. at 1072.
22. See gaearUy Dahia Lithwick, The Pied Sn Was Lee Bo)dMalw Brainwhd into a Kig
Madrjiv, Slate, at http-//slate.msn.com/id/2088893 (Sept. 25,2003) (stating that Malvo's defense
team intends to argue brainwashing as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase).
23. SeegmyabyJan Censi, Wker Faes COat Today it V inia Cmnpiracy Ga : A nrriam
Tali/mL kdy toSpndiL f inPmric SayLqdAn1'sts, NATL POST, Jan. 24, 2002, at A12, waidae
at 2002 WL 4164650 (stating that the defense may argue that Walker was brainwashed into joining
aIQaeda, similar to the Patty Hearst situation); Josh White, Lawes SayMalto Was Unrera 'Spdl'
Mdamdam ?dW Ywa, Die TeunCaiml inSno"Cse, WASH POST, June 26,2003, at B1,
ai/dleat 2003 WL 56501725 (stating that Malvo's diet and thoughts were controlled byMuham-
mad, which was relevant to Malvo's culpabilit).
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II. 7be Oigi q'Brimwhr
The term "brainwashing" was coined in 1951 by Edward Hunter, an
American journalist.24 Hunter was alluding to a form of mind control that was
used in the wake of the Communist takeover in China." Hunter formalized the
concept to explain how American prisoners of war ("POWs") converted to
Communism in the 1950s as a result of coercion bythe Communist Chinese and
North Korean armies."
Brainwashing bythe Communists was comprised of "an elaborate ritual of
systematic indoctrination, conversion, and self-accusation used to change non-
Communists into submissive followers of the party."" Dr. Joost Meerloo
("Meerloo") compares the process of brainwashing to Pavlov's theoryof condi-
tioning- 8 The prisoners of war were subjected to negative and positive condi-
tioning stimuli such as hunger and food.29 Once a POW conformed to the
political teachings his food rations were improved." According to Meerloo,
"Under the daily signal of dulling routine questions ... their minds went into a
state of inhibition and dismissed alertness."" This process broke down demo-
cratic thoughts and replaced them with conditioned reflexes. 2
24. STANLEY S. Q.AWAR & BRYNNE V. RIVUN, OIiLDREN HELD HCTAGE: DEALING
WMIPROGRAMMED ANDBRAINWASHED OIILDREN 1 (Faro. LawSec. ABA, 1991). Brainwashing
is defined as "the forcible application of prolonged and intensive indoctrination sometimes
including mental torture in an attempt to induce someone to give up basic political, social, or
religious beliefs and attitudes and to accept contrasting regimented ideas." WEBSTERSTHIRDNEW
INT'L DICTONARY (1993). The terms brainwashing, thought reform and coercive persuasion are
synonymous. Delgado, sim note 16, at 467.
25. CLAWAR&RVLIN, supr note 24, at 1.
26. EDWARD HUNTER, BRAINWASHING, THE STORY OF MEN WHo DEFIED IT 11-12
(1956).
27. SeJOOSTAM. MEERLOO, THE RAPE OF THE MIND, THE PSYCXOLOGYOF THOUGIHT
CONTROL, MENT[CIDE, AND BRAINWASHING 27 (1956) (discussing brainwashing, the implication
of the subject of enforced mental intrusion and the transformation of the free human mind into an
automatically responding machine).
28. Id at 48-52. Pavlov's experiment involved the use of negative and positive stimuli to
condition dogs to respond in a particularized manner to bells. Id at 37-38.
29. Id at 49.
30. Id
31. Id at 45. Note that every word can act as a Pavlovian signal.
32. Id In an official statement to the United Nations, Dr. Charles Mayo, a leading American
physician, stated:
[The tortures used ... although theyinclude ny brutal hysical injuries, are not like
the medieval torture of the rick and the thumb-screw. They are subtler, more pro-
longed, and intended to be more terrible in their effect. Theyare calculated to disinte-
rte the mind of an intelieat to distort his sense of values, to a point where
iot smplycy ou did id b will become a seemingly wMg accomplice




One of the most vivid examples of conversion was Colonel Frank H
Schwable, an officer of the United States Marine Corps, who was taken prisoner
of war bythe Chinese Communists.3 Colonel Schwable signed a confession that
the United States was conducting germ warfare against the enemy.4 After his
repatriation Schwable stated, "The words were mine, but the thoughts were
theirs. That is the hardest thing I have to explain: how a man can sit down and
write something he knows is false, and yet, to sense it, to feel it, to make it seem
real."3" Colonel Schwable's example shows that brainwashing within the prisoner
of war context involves the processes of conditioning or softening-up and
indoctrination or persuasion for conversion purposes using hunger, fatigue,
tenseness, threats and violence as the tools.
3 6
Traditional interpretations of brainwashing outside of the prisoner of war
context "assume a relatively passive subject under the control of all-powerful
(and, in the case of new religions, evil) external agents who use coercive and
manipulative techniques."37 The end result is a total negation of the old self and
the emplacement of a new one. The methods used to achieve this change may
be more subtle today, in that torture may not be used, but the basic
elements- intimidating suggestion, mass suggestion, dramatic persuasion,
humiliation, embarrassment, loneliness and isolation, continued interrogation
and over-burdening the unsteadymind- remain. 9 The process of brainwashing
may be sudden or it may occur over time and it may involve repetition of the
program until the subject responds with compliance.Y These processes "maybe
employed singularlyor in combination." 41 In the case of POWs, the "spell" was
broken once they returned home with only a few experiencing temporary
repercussions such as depression. 2
Id at 20.
33. MEERLOO, ss*M note 27, at 19. SeegmdyMimrwAxin th ePtsim G A Suyqfdr
LawardanA miJis fdN =KOm Cse, 56 Com L REV. 709 (May 1956). Colonel Schwable's case
is the only case of a germ warfare confession which progressed as far as the pre-trial court of
inquiry. Id at 742. Schwable was never brought to trial because the investigators found that the
tortures he suffered, both physical and psychological, constituted a reasonable excuse. Id at 743.
34. MEERLOO, sra note 27, at 19.
35. Id at 20.
36. HUNTER, su"ra note 26, at 199-202.
37. h-E BRAINWAHsN/DEPROGRAMMImv GONIhOVERSY: SOCOLOGICAL, PSYCOLOG-
ICAL, LEGAL AND HSTORICAL PERSPECnIVES 6 (David G. Bromley and James T. Richarison eds.,
1983) (discussing the controversyover the recruitment and socialization practices of new religions).
38. Id
39. Id at 89.
40. CLAWAR & RIVuN, supra note 24, at 8.
41. Id




The scientific community's attitude towards brainwashing lies on a contin-
uum. Some scientists view brainwashing as a legitimate theory.43 Others view
it as a pejorative term for the absorption of ideas disdained by the majority."
The scientific community was forced to take a stance in the early 1980s when
some mental health professionals testified as experts in court cases against new
religious movements.4" These experts testified to their own anti-cult theories of
brainwashing, mind control, or "coercive persuasion" as generally accepted
concepts withinthe scientific community' The American Psychological Associ-
ation ("APA") responded by forming the Deceptive and Indirect Methods of
Persuasion and Control ("DIMPAC") task force.47 The task force was responsi-
ble for, imer alia, investigating the techniques of psychological coercion and the
use of such techniques by new religions to control and recruit members.48
In February 1987, before DIMPAC completed its report, the APA Board
of Directors voted for the APA to participate in Molko v Hoiy SpiritA ss'nfor the
Umnfk%6 q'WorlOistmria by filing an amicus brief."0 The APA brief stated
that "as applied to new religious movements, the theory of coercive persuasion
'is not accepted in the scientific community' and that the relevant methodology
'has been repudiated by the scientific community.' " The APA withdrew the
brief immediately because the task force had yet to issue its findings. 2 In 1986,
43. Si THE BRAINwAsHING/DEPROGRAMMING CONMTOVERSY, supra note 37, at 320.
(stating that some psychiatrists and psychologists affirm that mind control, brainwashing, and
psychological kidnapping are meaningful and viable scientific concepts).
44. Id at 319. According to noted psychiatrist Dr. Thomas Szasz, "[Birainwashing is a
metaphor. A person can no more wash another's brain with coercion or conversation than he can
make him bleed with a cutting remark .... However, we do not call all types of personal or
psychological influences brainwhig. We reserve this term for influences of which we disapprove."
Id Dr. Walter Reich takes a similar view, arguing that brainwashing "undermines the foundation
of criminal law, which 'is based on the assumption of personal responsibility for one's own behav-
ior.'" Id
45. Alberto Amitrani & Raffaella Di Marzio, 7he Net mrx/ Story A Ccumm on M.
ltnmzwgls "L iv, L in, 7, ahttp://www.geockies.com/Ahens/Olympus/8393/Answer liar. htm
(last visited Oct. 4,2003) (quoting Massimo Introvigne, "Liar, Liarv": Bra s hir CESNUR and
APA, CESNURK Center for Studies on New Religions, 4, aT http://www.cesnur.org/testi/gan
dow-eng.htm) (last visited Oct. 29, 2003)).
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id at 11-13.
49. 762 P.2d 46 (CaL 1988).
50. Amitrani & Di Marzio, supra note 45, at 15. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the
Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46, 61 (Cal. 1988) (involving an attempt to argue
coercive persuasion as a defense to fraud).
51. Amitrani & Di Marzio, supra note 45, at 15 (quoting the Memorandum, APA, APA's
activities regarding the Mdko case, (July 11, 1989)).
52. Id at 20.
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DIMPAC submitted its final report to internal reviewers and to two outside
academics, Dr. JeffreyD. Fisher and Dr. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi5  The report
was rejected as lacking in "scientific rigor."' According to Dr. Beit-Hallahmni,
"The term brainwashing is not a recognized theoretical concept, and is just a
sensationalist explanation more suitable to cultists and revival preachers. It
should not be used bypsychologists because it does not explain anything.""5 In
the end, the APAtookthe position that it could not issue a final opinion because
it lacked sufficient information on the issue of brainwashing and its use by
religious cults.
5 6
Brainwashing as a scientific theory is complex because it involves the
evaluation of the intangible notion of free will. 7 As a result, empirical data
cannot be collected and analyzed.5 1 Scientists instead must infer that brainwash-
ing occurred based on the overwhelming presence of factors similarto those that
existed in the POW situation. 9 Despite the lack of empirical evidence on
brainwashing, science is essential to the development of the brainwashing
defense. Members of the laypublic, who are potential jurors, "hold beliefs that
'brainwashing' is an effective psychological process and that it is practiced by
'cults' in recruitment." ° The failure of Patty Hearst's case indicated that jurors
apparentlyare less accepting of the defense in criminal cases; therefore, scientific
testimony is essential to inform jurors of the effects of various brainwashing
methods on a defendant and to correct any misinformation a juror may
possess.' Unfortunately, the scientific community appears to remain fractured
53. Id at 31.
54. Memorandum from the Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology
("BSERP"), to the Members of the Task Force on Deceptive and Indirect Methods of Persuasion
and Control (DIMPAC ) (May 11, 1987), athttp://wwickross.com/reference/brainwashing/
brainwashingS. html [hereinafter Memorandum from BSERP] (commenting on the final report of
the DIMPAC task force).
55. AMERIcANPsYiOLOGICALASSOQATfONON"BRAINWASHING,": QO1nttr BrmzJi]wW.,
3, ar http://www.alphalinkcom.au/ -juliek/brainwashing/p04.html (last visited Oct. 4,2003)
(explaining the definition of brainwashing within the scientific community).
56. Memorandum from BSERP, s"p-a note 54.
57. THE BRAINWASHING/DEPROGRAMMING CONTROVERSY, sup-a note 37, at 323.
58. Id
59. Id
60. John S. Dewitt et aL, Noud Sdmtific E de and CooG osia1 Cns: A Sodal Psyijad
Exani ; 21 LAW&PSYCHOL REV. 1, 7 (1997).
61. Hamt, 466 F. Supp. at 1072; Dewitt et al., sWa note 60, at 12, 21. A mock jury was
polled to examine the response of jurors to novel scientific evidence. Dewitt et al., supa note 60,
at 23. The poll reflected that expert testimony about the use of brainwashing by new religions or
cults affected verdicts. Id The studyshowed that less reliable evidence was more effective because
the jurors had pre-existing misperceptions that were consistent with the less reliable information.
Ia The study concluded that in situations in which jurors had weak or non-existent attitudes
towardis brainwashing and plaintiffs offered no expert testimonyto influence them, the mock jurors
appeared to scrutinize the facts in favor of the defendant in a civil case. Id This information
2003]
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on the issue of brainwashing, which currently undermines the validity and
admissibility of research on this issue.62
B. L egd A eptmv
Brainwashing has been offered successfully as a necessity defense in crimi-
nal cases in which deprogrammers have been charged with kidnapping.
63
Deprogrammers argue that the crime of kidnapping is excused by necessity.64
The crime of kidnapping is posited as the lesser evil; the greater evil is that of
leaving the coerced individual with the cult or influencing group.6 Unless the
coerced individual in question is a minor, legal alternatives to kidnapping are
lacking. If the court allows the defendant to assert brainwashing in this form,
evidence of life within the group, as well as the group's belief system, is admissi-
ble. Deprogrammers use the evidence of interaction within the group to argue
that anyone who accepts the belief of the group must have been brainwashed.6'
The inabilityof the brainwashed individual to exercise his free will becomes the
justification for the kidnapping.
The theory, however, has not been effective for more serious crimes. For
example, in Hamt, the jury rejected the brainwashing defense. 7 The question
of whether or not Hearst had the requisite intent to commit the crime became
the sole issue of fact for trial68 In her defense, Hearst testified about the
"grueling, distasteful ordeal that she underwent with the SLA after her kidnap-
ping, including her atrocious and outrageous mistreatment in the closet where
she was kept blindfolded for days without relief."69 Hearst also offered the
testimonyof three psychiatrists to confirm that she was coerced bythe SLA into
robbing the bank.!0 The jury apparently believed that Hearst was a willing
participant and did not believe the coercion theory presented by the defense.71
should be factored into the juryselection process of a criminal trial in which brainwashing evidence
will be proffered.
62. Seediscussion ibfu Part IV.A.1.
63. Se James T. Richardson, "Bnrimwsb Claim ard Mi=4 Rdi Oside dr Uritai
Stam: CG adDfnqQicfaiQiUe Coa ithieL edAwm, 1996 BYUL.REV. 873,883(1996)
(summarizing the origins of brainwashing ideas as app lied to religious groups). Deprogrammers
also assert brainwashing as a defense in civil suits. l at 885. The defense focuses on the motiva-
tion of the deprogrammers in violating the law, which is deemed a lesser evil than not rescuing the
.programmed" individual Id at 886-87.
64. Id at 883.
65. Id at 883-84.
66. Id at 884.
67. Hamt, 466 F. Supp. at 1072.
68. Id. at 1071.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id at 1072.
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Hearst was found guilty and sentenced to seven years in prison." Though not
explicitly stated in the opinion, Hawt appears to have established two facts: (1)
a defendant arguing brainwashing possesses the requisite intent to commit the
crime; and (2) coercion does not completely exculpate a brainwashed victin 3
Ha=rt, however, did not address whether a defendant could use incidents of
brainwashing to argue fora reduced sentence rather than complete exculpation."4
More recently, the court in UriadStat v FishnrvP rejected the defense in
a mail fraud case. 6 In its ruling, the court stated, "Defendant's proffered
testimony negating the element of specific intent relates exclusively to alleged
influence techniques brought to bear upon him by the Church of Scientology,
which is an aspect of thought reform theorythat the Court has deemed inadmis-
sible under the Frye standard."" The Fishmmn ruling reflects the perception held
bythe legal communitythat brainwashing is pseudo-science. As a result, courts
continue to rule against admitting the theory as evidence.'
IIL A nogoa D mes: Duyes and Bawei Wcnun Sy'krm
The criminal justice system currently provides many defenses to crimes in
the forms of justification or excuse. The common law and modem penal codes
72. Id
73. SeHemt, 466 F. Supp. at 1072 (stating that "the jury apparently believed that Hearst
freely participated in the robbery and did not believe the coercion theory" in spite of the over-
whelming evidence to the contrary).
74. Hearst's sentence later was commuted conditionally in 1979 by President Carter, who
stated:
It is the consensus of all those most familiar with this case that but for the extraordi-
naacriminal and degrading experiences that the petitioner suffered as a victim of the
SL she would not have be come a participant in the criminal acts for which she stands
convicted and sentence[d] and would not have suffered the punishment and other
consequences she has endured.
Patty Hearst Online, The Afienwr, 11, at http'J/www.claykeckcom/patty/aftermath.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003) (describing the pardon campaign of Patricia Hearst).
75. 743 F. Supp. 713 (ND. Cal. 1990).
76. SwUnited States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713,723 (ND. Cal 1990) (holding that expert
testimonyregarding coercive persuasion practices of religious cults were not sufficientlyestablished
within the scientific community to be admissible as evidence of brainwashing).
77. Id at 722.
78. SeeUnked States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186,1196 (6th Chr. 1987). The trial court ruled
the expert testimony inadmissible for failing to conform with Federal Rules of Evidence 702. The
court further stated that the proper foundation was not laid because "criticisms voiced ... suggest
that [expert's] 'involuntary conversion' theory is not scientifically recognized." Id SeealsoMdko,
762 P2d at 61. The trial court in Molko refused to allow evidence of coercive persuasion in the
plaintiff's case for fraud, but the appellate court stated "that neither the federal nor state constitu-
tions bars Molko and Leal from bringing traditional fraud actions against the Church for allegedly
inducing them... into knownly entering an atmosphere in whichI they were then subjected to
coercive persuasion" and held that the trial court erred in its decision. Mdk, 762 P.2d at 61.
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recognize two distinct situations in which an offender could be excused on the
ground that the crime should be attributed to the pressure exerted by a third
party and not to the offender's free will." The first situation is duress and the
second is the marital coercion defense that re-emerged in the mid- 1970s as BWS.
Brainwashing shares the premise of duress and BWS because it too asserts that
pressure from a third party is the impetus for the criminal offense. Therefore,
the legal development of duress and BWS suggests how brainwashing should be
framed as a defense. Bygarnering clues from related defenses, brainwashing can
avoid several legal pitfalls.
A. Dus
A defendant will be acquitted of an offense other than murder under the
common law definition of duress if he proves that: (1) a person unlawfully
threatened imminentlyto kill or grievously injure him or another, and (2) he was
not at fault in exposing himself to the threat.8" The common law definition
hinges on the threat of deadly force to justify the actions of a coerced actor."'
The Model Penal Code ("MPC') definition is different for several reasons; most
notably, it allows a defendant to plead duress as an excuse to anycrime, including
murder.8 2 The MPC defines duress as:
[A]n affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged
to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person
of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
have been unable to resist.
8 3
The level of force referred to in the MPC definition need only be enough "that
a person of reasonable firmness in the actor's situation would have been unable
to resist."84 The MPC definition also involves the jury more deeply in the
79. See Anne M. Coughlin, Exoasig Wwv4 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 29 (1994) (arguing that the
BWS defense implies that women do not have the same capacity as men for self-governance and
suggesting ways in which it maybe reconstructed to be more effective).
80. Joshua Dressier, Exegsis oftLeLawjDwms: Jwt4 d eExu6seandSavmh bfrits Pmper
Lii s, 62 S. CAL L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1989) [hereinafter Dressier, Exegeis qftheLaw qfDus]
(oudining the proper limits of the duress defense within which the justification overlap is discussed).
81. Id at 1341.
82. Id at 1344.
83. MODELPENALCODE S 2.09 (1985);seealsoDressler, supra note 80, at 1344 (outlining the
common law and MPC treatment of the duress defense). Thirteen states have adopted in whole
or in substantial part the MPCdefinition of duress, including Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota
and Utah. Id at 1343 n.89.
84. Dressier, Exe is f the Lawq(Amhs, sur note 80, at 1344.
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determination of the excuse than is the case at common law because the jury
determines whether the hypothetical reasonable person would resist the threat."5
Most states treat duress as an excuse." In general, a defendant asserting the
defense of duress must demonstrate that his criminal conduct was the product
of an unlawful threat that caused him reasonablyto believe that performing the
criminal conduct was his only reasonable opportunity to avoid imminent death
or serious bodily harm either to himself or to another. 7 The defense of duress
is triggered onlyif the threatened harm is immediate; the defense is not available
to a coerced actor who had an opportunity to avoid the illegal activity.
These requirements are similar in the POW misconduct charges." In the
POW misconduct charges, duress was pleaded in two ways- as individual and
general duress.89 Onlyindividual duress is relevant to this discussion because the
individual defendant's state of mind is at issue; no two defendants will have the
same traits for susceptibility, nor will theyrespond similarlyto the same coercive
influence."' However, note that general duress- a condition suffered by all
prisoners- could only be offered as a mitigating factor under special circum-
stances.91 Individual duress- physical and psychological torture aimed at an
individual- could completely excuse the offender, go towards mitigation, or do
neither, depending on the nature of the coercion.92 Individual duress was raised
successfullyin one case in which the threat was imminent and the actor had no
reasonable means to escape or avoid the coercion."' Mere deprivation of life-
sustaining necessities, such as food and water, were held invalid as a defense to
guilt but were allowed to be used in mitigation.94
The framework of the duress defense is applicable to brainwashing. Similar
to a defendant asserting duress, a brainwashed defendant acknowledges that he
acted "consciously, even enthusiastically, fully aware of the wrongfulness of his
85. Id at 1345.
86. Id at 1356.
87. See eg, Edwards v. Texas, 106 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. CL. App. 2003) (affirming the
defendant's conviction for capital murder because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject
the duress claim. The defendant asserted that he feared a deadly attack from his co-defendants,
who testified to the contrarythat he was a willing participant); Samv. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d
832, 839 (Va. 1991) (affirming the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because his
pareipationin the crime was not the only reasonable opportunityhe had to prevent his fanilyfrom
being harmed).
88. Misaodutt in the Prison Canp, supra note 33, at 768 (exploring the history of prisoner
misconduct and the problems raised by the prosecution of resulting cases).
89. Id
90. id
91. Id at 768-69.
92. Idat768.
93. Id at 769.
94. Mismazdu in &te Prison C np, su note 33, at 769-70.
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actions.""' The brainwashing defense argues that despite the existence of mens
rea the defendant is morally blameless because the guilty mind with which the
defendant acted was not his own.6 Unlike duress, however, the threat does not
have to be imminent. Rather, the defendant must establish that the crime was
committed while under the coercive influence.
The brainwashing defense is most analogous to duress in the POW cases.
Note that the decision to excuse a POW was an individualized assessment. The
assessment should be the same in brainwashing cases. A 'reasonable person'
standard would be inappropriate because no two defendants will respond in the
same way to psychological manipulation. For example, persons with low self-
esteem are more susceptible than others to coercion, therefore the degree of low
self-esteem may alter the time and extent to which they are affected by coercion.
Acceptance of duress, however, clearly shows that the legal system, and by
extension society, is willing to accept that there are circumstances in which a
defendant's free will may be overborne. Most states eventually accepted that
those circumstances occur in the case of duress. It therefore becomes important
to frame a brainwashing defense in a manner similar to duress.
B. Bamei Womn Syrh'cn?
Marital coercion was the second defense that excused defendants based on
the pressure exerted by a third party. Although marital coercion defense no
longer exists, it was refined to create what is now BWS. In the case of marital
coercion defense, a married woman would be excused for engaging in criminal
misconduct if she executed the act because of the coercion of her husband.97 A
husband's command that his wife commit a particular act was enough to estab-
lish coercion.98 The rule provided that a married woman was entitled to a
coercion presumption if she committed a crime in the presence of her husband
and, therefore, could not be held personallyresponsible for her conduct.99 Inthe
marital coercion defense, the law refused to blame the wife because her miscon-
duct was reflective of the choices of her husband only."°
Battered Woman Syndrome incorporates most of the elements of the
marital coercion defense and is currentlydescribed as "a 'sociological theory of
behavioral patterns' based upon the physical and psychological abuse found in
95. Delgado, supra note 16, at 499.
96. Id
97. Coughlin, sura note 79, at 30.
98. Id at 31. A married woman is no longer entitled to a coercion presumption. Id at 58.
SeerayPancoast v. Commonwealth, 340 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 1986). Today, a married woman must
clearly show that she exhibits the characteristics of BWS. See Steffani J. Saitow, Note, Bamdru
Wanm Synm De 7he "Rasoawe Bammd Wrnm"Exist?, 19 NEw. ENG. J. ON Cum & QV.
CONFINEMENT 329, 339 (1993) (discussing the characteristics and admissibilityof expert testimony
on BWS).
99. Coughlin, supra note 79, at 31.
100. Id at 44.
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women involved in battering relationships."'' A woman asserting the BWS
defense must prove that she exhibited the characteristics of the syndrome at the
time of the killing."°2 A battered woman is defined as "[a] woman who is repeat-
edly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for
her rights." 0 3 A woman must go through two complete cycles of abuse before
she can be labeled a "battered woman."'" These cycles involve a tension-
building phase, followed by the explosion or acute battering incident, and
culminate in the loving contrition phase."0 Additionally, learned helplessness is
another component of the syndrome."° Learned helplessness explains why a
battered woman remains in a relationship that is both psychologically and
physically harmful
07
A woman may assert BWS as a defense in two distinct ways. First, a
woman who is accused of killing her abuser may assert it as an imperfect self
defense claim.' Second, she may use it in support of a duress claim in which
she asserts that she committed the crime because she feared violent retaliation
byher spouse if she disobeyed his illegal command."° This article is concerned
only with the assertion of the defense in support of duress.
At trial, expert testimony focuses on the use of violence bythe batterer to
coerce his female partner into doing what he desired." 0 The argument is that the
101. Saitow, ssu note 98, at 339 (quoting SARA LEE JOHANN & FRANK OSANKA, REPRE-
SENTING BATTERED WOMEN W) KILL 27(1989)).
102. Id
103. Id
104. See Lori S. Rubenstein, What is Baten Wwnml Srnir , Family Law Advisor Articles,
1, at http://www.divorcenet.com/or/or-artO2.html (last visited Sept. 30,2003) (descrbing BVS
in the legal system).
105. Saitow, supra note 98, at 342.
106. See State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Wis. 1994) (arguin BWS in defense to
charge of second-degree reckless homicide in the killing of the defendant's boyfriend); see aso
Saitow, supra note 98, at 344.
107. Sse eg, State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 571 (Wash. 1984) (arguing BWS and effects of
learned helplessness in defense to a charge of second-degree murder of the defendant's husband);
United States v. Gordon, 638 F. Supp. 1120,1138 (W.D. La. 1986) (noting that an expert described
learned helplessness as" 'a woman's loss of her voluntarywill'" (quoting the Trial Record at 534)).
108. Coughlin, supr note 79, at 55. As an imperfect self-defense claim the defense asks jurors
to determine that the accused woman suffered from cognitive disabilities, resulting from the abuse,
that deprived her of the capacity to choose lawful conduct. See Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 476
(Nev. 2000) (stating that the defendant argued that she accidentally killed her lover in self-defense
as a result of BVS).
109. Coughlin, s"pra note 79, at 56; see also Neelley v. State, 642 So2d 494, 505 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993) (stating that the defendant argued that because of the abuse inflicted by her husband,
she lacked the criminal intent for the offense).
110. Coughlin, spra note 79, at 57. The common thread from the research on BWS in this
article is that BVS was extended to wives only. However, it may be extended to cases where a long
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abusive relationship reduces "the woman to a state of 'psychological paralysis'
and abject faith in her batterer's omnipotence, which ma[kes] it impossible for
her to reject his illegal commands.""' Indeed, a battered woman is fully aware
of her actions; she merely is restricted from exercising her free will because it is
replaced bythe will of her abuser.' The actions of her abuser do not negate the
reality that she knowingly engaged in an illegal act. A woman who is able to
manifest a capacity for independence will be punished, while a woman who is
able to establish that her abuser controlled her behavior may be excused."3
However, in keeping with the basic premise of the criminal justice system, the
battered woman actuallyshould be punished, but arguablyto a lesser degree. It
is widely acknowledged that the notion of long-termpsychological pressures that
render a person submissive to an abuser should be considered as mitigating.1
4
Expert testimony regarding BWS is admissible onlywhen it is relevant and
helpful to the jury to evaluate a defendant's credibility or to determine that a
witness is properly qualified."' The expert is allowed to explain battering and its
general effects, such as endurance of physical and emotional abuse, delays or
failure to report abuse, or a recant of allegations of abuse when help was forth-
coming."6 The expert is prohibited, however, from opining that the specific
defendant is a battered woman." 7 The purpose of the evidence in these cases is
limited to helping the jury understand the state of mind of a battered woman at
the time the offense was committed."' According to the courts, expert testi
standing intimate relationship is established. See State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 49-50 (Wash. 1994)
(defining a battered woman as a woman "subjected to repeatedly coercive behavior by a man she
is intimately involved with ... but not necessarily manied [to], although she often is").
111. Coughlin, sup note 79, at 57. The BWS defense within the duress context closely
mirrors the marital coercion doctrine. Id
112. Sw id at 56-57.
113. Id at 59.
114. See Laurie Kratky Dore, Dow dA'mtnz'st and de Slipey Slqi The Use qfDuns in
Dee qf'Banemd C ks, 56 OH!OST. L.J. 665,757 (1995) (outlining overlap between BWS and
the defense of duress).
115. S, eg, State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Mlnn. 1997) (finding that expert
testimony of BWS is admissible to help the jury understand the alleged victims behavior); People
v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Iich. 1995) (noting that an expert in the field of domestic
violence and BWXS offered evidence on the generalities associated with the syndrome); Rogers v.
Florida, 616 So. 2d 1098,1100 (Fla. 1993) (concluding that BWS has now gained general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community as a matter of law).
116. GCritd, 537 N.W.2d at 205; seealsoBokirs, 995 P.2d at 474, 477 (stating that "seventy-six
percent of the states have found expert testimony on battering and its effects admissible to prove
the defendant is a battered woman"); People v. Hryckewicz, 634 N.YS.2d 297,298 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (admitting expert testimony regarding learned helplessness to explain behavior on the part
of the defendant that might seem unusual to a lay juror unfamiliar with the patterns of response
exhibited bya person who has been physically abused over a period of time).
117. (Yris&4 537 N.W.2d at 201.
118. S-, eg, id at 200; Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992) (assert that the expert
testimony regarding BWS is admissible to help the jury understand the defendant's state of mind,
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monyis essential to correct the mistaken conclusions that jurors maydraw from
their own experiences. "9 The courts point out that jurors often reach a common
sense conclusion that if the abuse was as bad as the woman claimed, she would
have left her abuser earlier.
120
A cursory analysis of BWS in relation to brainwashing provides several
lessons because both defenses involve a person coerced to act in a manier in
which he or she presumablywould not act if not under the influence of another.
First, expert testimony is necessary to dispel layperson views and to explain
novel concepts. Second, lay witness testimony is useful to bolster the expert's
assertion that the actor exhibited indicia of coercion. Third, the defense is most
effective when used for mitigation purposes,' especially when it was first
presented in the guilt/innocence phase. Duress in conjunction with the BWS
defense establishes the foundation for legitimizing the brainwashing defense.
Both defenses are analyticallyand functionallysimilar to brainwashing. It is time
for the legal community to acknowledge an existing class of defendants and
embrace the defense.
IV. Appication to Dawt Perly Cse
Imagine you are appointed to represent the scared teenage college student
turned armed bank robber. A prudent attorney would be skeptical at best when
the student explains that her actions were a result of brainwashing. In fact, you
probably harbor similar views as members of the scientific community and legal
profession. The dutyof appointed counsel, however, is to serve the interests of
the client and to explore every viable defense.
Brainwashing, like BWS, cannot be pleaded as a complete defense. It is
most feasible as an element of an imperfect "mental disease" or "diseased mind"
defense. It is an incomplete defense because a brainwashed defendant intends
that is, a reasonable belief of imminent danger, at the time of the offense).
119. Se eg, Balxda 840 P.2d at 8 (asserting that admission of expert testimonyregarding the
BWS is necessaryto counter misconceptions held byaverage jurors); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970,
974 (Ohio 1990) (asserting that admission of expert testimony regarding BWS assists the trier of
fact in determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger).
120. Se eg, Gudner, 569 N.W.2d at 195 (asserting that expert testimony on BWS could help
jurors understand whywomen return to or stayin battering relationships); Bonner v. State, 740 So.
2d 439, 440 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (finding expert testimony necessary for purposes of showing
coping mechanisms of battered women and whythey do not leave abusive homes); Harrington v.
State, No. CR-00- 1861, 2002 WL 31399441, at *19-A20 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2002) (noting the
admissibility of BWS evidence in California and Mdissouri courts to explain why women use deadly
force instead of simply leaving the relationship).
121. See Naie'y 642 So. 2d at 507. Neelley argued that because of the abuse inflicted by her
husband, she lacked the criminal intent for the offense. Id at 505. This assertion is incorrect.
Neelleyintended the consequence of her actions, which was the murder of a third party. Id at 507.
The abuse she suffered, therefore, did not negate the requisite intent. Id Instead, the abuse byher
husband altered her ability to exercise her free will. Id
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the consequences of his actions and believes his actions are justified. Therefore,
the requisite mens rea and actus reus are present. A brainwashed defendant,
however, is not wholly responsible because the intent involved was superim-
posed. The main argument then is that, although the defendant committed the
crime, he is not wholly responsible because he acted with the intent of another.
The superimposed intent was a result of intentional coercive influences that
overcame his free will. Introducing evidence of brainwashing during the
guilt/innocence phase explains brainwashing within the context of a different,
but established, defense. As an element, brainwashing explains whythe defen-
dant committed the offense charged.
The brainwashing defense can be laid out more extensively in the sentenc-
ing phase. In a capital case, "[c]ounsel at every stage have an obligation to
conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both
guilt and penalty."22 According to the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Guidelines for Death PenaltyDefense, a capital defense team should consist of
at least one mitigation specialist and one fact investigator.123 Appointment of the
mitigation specialist is essential in preparing a brainwashing case. The informa-
tion that a mitigation specialist may uncover can impact the first phase of the
defense and decisions about expert evaluations. It mayalso mean the difference
between life and death in a capital case. The battle is uphill in a case that asserts
brainwashing as a defense because it currently lacks acceptance within the legal
community. The battle, however, is winnable if brainwashing is not asserted as
a complete defense but rather as mitigation.
A. G&Imrma Phze
An attorney representing a client who asserts brainwashing as an excuse
should begin laying the foundation during the guilt/innocence stage. The
inclination of some attorneys may be to reserve introducing the principle of
brainwashing until sentencing. Such a strategy may be prejudicial to the client.
The onus is on the defense to alter the perception of brainwashing held by
criminal jurors. Whether the jury will find the defendant guilty is irrelevant; the
risk of waiting until sentencing to introduce such a controversial issue is too
great. Ideally, the defense wants jurors to be inclined to recommend life impris-
onment instead of death at the conclusion of the guilt/innocence stage.
During the guilt/innocence phase the defense should front-load mitigation
evidence through the use of expert and layperson testimony. Three types of
information about the defendant should be provided at this stage. First, defense
. 122. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
PenaltyCases, Guideline 10.7 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter ABAGuidelines for Death PenaltyDefense],
auti Ue a http://www.abanetorg/deathpenaty/guideine.pdf.
123. ABA Guidelines for Death PenaltyDefense, Guideline 4.1(A)(2) (Feb. 2003), ai/abeat
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenaky/guidelines.pdf. For a complete discussion of mitigation
specialists see Daniel L. Payne, Buikd&A CGeforL#e A Mtiim aistasaNezsiiadaMater
cfRO4 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43 (2003).
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counsel should determine the susceptibility of the defendant to compelled
conversion."4 Some individuals are more susceptible to influence based on age
or mental deficiency. Evidence of the defendant's inclination to succumb to peer
pressure or irrational obedience to authority figures would be useful to establish
this prong. 2 ' Second, counsel must discover the methods used to coerce the
defendant. The defendant must give a reason for the juryto believe that his free
will was negated. For example, when Hearst was first captured she was subjected
to constant assaults of mental crueltyand torture. 26 Members of the SLA would
"periodically open the door to her prison and shout slogans and propaganda,
condemning her as a 'bourgeois bitch.'"' 27 Hearst was also subjected to repeated
rapes byvarious members of the SLA." Consistent with the textbook process
of brainwashing, as her grip on her free will was weakening, the same members
of the SLA began treating her in a more comradely fashion and exposing her to
their political beliefs. 29 Expert testimonywould be useful to explain the effects
of each method of coercion on the defendant." 0 Third, the character traits of
the defendant before, during, and after the coercive influence was imposed are
important to establish that the defendant was influenced by another. If the
defendant reverts to his previous characteristics after the coercive element is
removed, it reinforces the argument that all actions contrary to the defendant's
established character were the product of brainwashing. For example, it was
newsworthy when alleged sniper John Lee Malvo's behavior in court changed;
it was reported that he was animated and friendly for the first time.' These
descriptions were consistent with the descriptions of Malvo before he met John
Allen Muhammad, his co-defendant. is attomeys attributed the change to
Malvo "breaking through a cloud of brainwashing."' All three types of infor
124. Donald T. Lunde and Thomas E. Wilson, BnzmuWhirga a D*eto CrbiimLiai
PattyHmtReisit4 13 (Am L. BULL 341, 378 (1977). Lunde and Wilson proposed three factors
in mitigation; however, only the susceptibility to compelled conversion factors is necessary for this
analysis. Id
125. Sw K znimk4 821 F.2d at 1194 (noting that the defense tried to introduce expert
testimony stating that, given the victims' low mentality, the psychological pressures exerted upon
them created an "involuntary conversion" akin to brainwashing.)
126. Patty Hearst Online, 7e7xK supra note 1, at 11.
127. Id
128. Patty Hearst Online, 7e Cnwimi, 2, at http-/www.claykeckcom/patty/
conversion.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Patty Hearst Online, 7he Gaeien]
(describing the process of converting Patty Hearst into a member of the SLA).
129. Id at 3.
130. See Cmitd, 537 N.W.2d at 202-03 (discussing the testimony of experts in the field of
domestic violence and BS and the effects they had in their respective trials).
131. SeeJosh White, TwA NiwrMalols Envog LawvsSa;WASHPOST, Sept. 18, 2003, at
B1, aud&Ue at 2003 WL 62216396 (describing the change in Malvo's behavior in that he was
described as unusually attentive and alert and he flashed wide smiles and joked with his guards).
132. Id at B5. SealsoTomJackman &Joha White, Malw OnrktoA amdMudamud s Sner
Tria4 WAsHPsT, Oct. 17,2003, atAl,awdiabeat2003 WL 62223631 (reporting defense attorney's
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mation must be narrowlytailored to the specific characteristics of the defendant.
The jury is more likely to reject generalizations because the standard in this
inquiryis cast as that of the reasonable person. Therefore, generalizations would
be inappropriate and prejudicial to the defendant. The jury's perception must
focus on the defendant as the reasonable person.
During the guilt/innocence phase the main issue will be whether the
defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit the charged crime. The
brainwashing defense posits that, although the defendant intended the conse-
quences of his action, the intent with which he acted was not his own. Introduc-
tion of the three narrowly tailored pieces of information addresses this intent
question and lays the foundation for mitigation.
1. Extert Testnmy
The main hurdle in asserting a brainwashing defense is overcoming the lack
of supporting empirical research. In Virginia, courts are required to "appoint
one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to
assist the defense in preparation and presentation of information... [concerning]
whether the defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at
the time of the offense."'33 A copy of the report produced bythe expert must
be given to the Commonwealth "after the attomeyforthe defendant gives notice
of an intent to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation."134
Courts that admit expert testimonyin brainwashing cases have relied on the
standard set forth in Frye v UrndState.m' The defendant in Fr)ewas convicted
of second-degree murder.'36 Frye was denied his request to have an expert
testifyabout the results of his lie-detector test."" The appellate court found that
the lie-detector test had not yet "gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justifythe courts in
admitting expert testimony."'38 This standard of admissibility for expert testi-
mony became known as the Frye standard or the general acceptance test.39 The
Frye standard simply did not take into consideration the future acceptance of
observation that "Malvo is gradually emerging from Muhammad's mental manipulation... 'We
are recapturing the child' ").
133. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003).
134. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(D).
135. Sw Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C CAr. 1923) (setting forth the standard
for admitting expert testimony).
136. Id at 1013.
137. Id at 1014 (stating that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs").
138. Id
139. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (concluding that the




novel scientific theories. 40
The court in United Star v Fisbhrnm41 applied the Frye standard.'42 The
Fisbmmdefendant was charged with mail fraud. Fishman sought to have experts
testifythat he was incredibly suggestive, compulsive and obsessive. 43 Fishman
also wanted experts to testify that he was subjected to intense suggestion by the
Church of Scientology, which, combined with his previous psychological condi-
tion, permitted his mental state to evolve to a point of extremelyclouded reason-
ing and judgment" The Fishmmn court held that mental health professionals'
theories regarding coercive persuasion practices by religious cults were not
sufficiently established within the scientific community to be admissible as
evidence of brainwashing. 4 1 The determining factor in Fisbrmn was the lack of
general acceptance of the proffered testimony in the scientific community.14
Admission of expert testimony is no longer governed, however, by the
general acceptance standard. Admission of expert testimony is now controlled
byDaulot v Merrdi DowPhvnuaiwA. 4 In Dwaur the pharmaceutical com-
pany was sued for defects resulting from the drug Bendectin' The plaintiffs
proffered the testimony of several experts, which was rejected under Fr)e bythe
trial court.' 49 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that the
Federal Rules of Evidence, not Fr)e, provide the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony."s According to Federal Rules of Evidence 702, expert
testimony is admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue."1"' In order to qualify as" 'scientific knowledge'
the knowledge must be "derived by the scientific method."5 2  Proposed
140. Seegituy Lee Richard Goebes, 7beEqkdizyPRkReisita. TheRdai q'Daubert
v. Menell Dow Pharmaceuticals to Ake v. Oklahoma, 15 CAP. DIEF. J. 1 (2003).
141. 743 F. Supp. 713 (ND. Cal. 1990).
142. Fishma, 743 F. Supp. at 716 (stating that the principles established in F, were used to
determine admissibility of expert testimony from mental health professionals).
143. Id at 715.
144. Id
145. Id at 719-20. Evidence provided to the court showed that there was no consensus or
general acceptance within the APA and the American SociologicalAssociation regarding brainwash-
ing or thought reform theories at the time of the trial Id at 719.
146. Id at 720.
147. See DauLb! 509 U.S. at 597. See gwemuUy United States v. Lester, 234 F. Supp. 2d 595
(ED. Va. 2002) (using the Dode/ standard to analyze the admission of expert testimony).
148. Daub, 509US. at 582.
149. Id at 583.
150. Id at 587.
151. Id at 591; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (prescribing rules for the introduction of expert
testimony on scientific, technical or specialized knowledge).
152. Dauhert, 509 U.S. at 590.
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testimony must be validated by sound scientific principles."5 3
In the case of brainwashing, views within the scientific community are
fractured. The jury, however, should be allowed to assess the evidence under the
Daunt standard. The reliabilityassessment of expert evidence does not require
"explicit identification of a relevant scientific communityand an express determi-
nation of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.""5 4 Daubet
abandoned the general acceptance requirement in favor of a more flexible
standard that permits admission of evidence that has minimal support. 55 The
Daumvn standard focuses on the principles and methodology employed to
generate a scientific conclusion, not the conclusion itself." 6
The adversary system provides the means for attacking admissible, but
questionable, evidence. 7 Under Daut the evidence in Fisbmn would have
been admissible for consideration by the jury. In Fisbnw the mental health
professional was permitted to testify and give her opinion as to whether or not
the defendant was suffering from a mental defect at the time of the offense.'
Testimonyinvolving thought reformwas prohibited, however, because the court
determined that the views of the expert were not generally accepted within the
scientific community' 9 The expert concluded that the combination of the
Church's influence techniques and the defendant's previous psychological
condition permitted his mental state to evolve to a point of extremely clouded
reasoning and judgment."s As a result, the expert concluded that the defendant
was led to believe that his participation in the fraud scheme was not a reprehensi-
ble act.' 6' The conclusion by the Fisbm psychologist that the defendant was
unaware that the fraud scheme was reprehensible is irrelevant to our analysis. A
defendant who asserts brainwashing as a defense acknowledges that he was
aware of the nature of his actions and intentionally committed the illegal action.
Of importance, however, is the psychologist's analysis based on examination of
the defendant's susceptibility to coercion and the methods employed by the
Church in concluding that the defendant was coerced. The psychologist's
analysis is not a conclusion, rather it is an explanation of the relevant principles
153. Id S~gnwa/yGoebes, s"r note 140, at 30 (outlining the factors judges should consider
when determining whether the scientific reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid.)
154. DwbeY4 509 U.S. at 594.
155. Id at 594-95.
156. Id
157. S& gmary Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1984), at diia, 471
U.S. 1111 (1985). In cases in which the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the offense is
placed at issue through expert opinion testkmony, the Commonwealth is entitled to explore on cross
examination the scope and limits of the expert's opinion on the subject.
158. Fishmr; 743 F. Supp. at 723.
159. Id




and methodologies to assist the trier of fact to make a conclusion.
In Virginia, expert testimonyis a predicate to the introduction of laywitness
testimonyin cases in which a defendant's mental condition is in question. Under
the law of Virginia, a defendant may not offer the testimony of lay witnesses
during the guilt phase until expert testimonyis proffered. 62 The Supreme Court
of Virginia, commenting on the insanity defense, stated that "it is generally
recognized that it is advisable to adduce expert testimonyto better resolve such
a complex problem." 63 Therefore, a defendant in Virginia asserting an insanity
defense, and presumably anydefense involving a mental disease or defect, must
lay the foundation for lay witness testimony with verified expert testimony.
Once expert testimony is presented, lay witnesses may give their observations
about the defendant that are supportive of the expert evaluation.
Though courts should not resist admitting evidence on brainwashing, the
possibility still exists. Brainwashing, however, has support in the form of the
duress and BWS defenses. Expert testimony is permissible in battered woman
cases to aid the jury in understanding the state of mind of a battered woman.
Similarly, anyevidence offered about the effects of brainwashin will aid the jury
in understanding the phenomena of "superimposed mens rea." "4 It is essential
for the juryto understand that the defendant knowinglycomrnmitted the crime but
not by his or her own free will. The line is a fine one and cannot be left for only
laypersons to decipher.
2. Lay Wars Testnmzi y
Lay witness testimony should be given in conjunction with expert opinion
testimony to bolster the expert opinion testimony. Testimony of this nature is
most useful to establish the demeanor of the defendant before, during, and after
the coercive influence was imposed. Arguably, if the defendant was not exercis-
ing his free will at the time of the offense, he is not as culpable and should not
be subject to a punishment similar to that imposed on a person who was able to
exercise free will. Though not enumerated in the ABA Guidelines for Death
Penalty Defense, counsel is required to seek out and interview potential wit-
nesses as part of the general investigation requirements. 65 A witness is defined
as anyperson "familiar with aspects of the [defendant's] historythat might affect
162. S&McCullochv. Commonwealth, 514 S.E.2d 797,798-99 (Va. 1999) (denying admission
of lay witness testimonyto support insanitydefense because expert testimony was not introduced).
163. Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 274 S.El2d 305,311 (Va. 1981) (stating that although insanity
or sanity may be established by lay witnesses, it is better to have the reasoning of an expert).
164. JoshuaDressler,/ t*cDdgdo's "Bmh zir q CaatigA LmistLerdS)sm
in JUSTIFICATION AND EXcJSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW, A COLLECTON OF ESSAYS 497, 499
(Achael Louis Cor-do ed., 1994) [hereinafter Dressier, Ddzdos "Brairwxn Dee] (criticizing
Professor Delgado's brainwashing thesis; asserting that acceptance of the thesis would create a
blameless defense and release dangerous persons back into society).
165. ABA Guidelines for Death Penalty Defense, s"qmz note 122, at Commentary 1016.
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the likelihood that the [defendant] committed the charged offense(s), and the
degree of culpability for the offense. " " Witnesses include, but are not limited
to, members of the immediate family and extended family, neighbors, friends,
acquaintances and former teachers. 6 '
.Lay witnesses are permitted to testify about the attitude and demeanor of
a defendant.168 Under Virginia law, laywitnesses are prohibited fromusing terms
that mayimplya medical conclusion.'69 Therefore, in preparing laywitnesses to
testify, it is essential to conveyto them the importance of not using terms such
as brainwashed, indoctrinated, coerced, or similar catch phrases. Failure to
impart to witnesses the necessity of not using such phrases may undermine the
effect of their testimony. For instance, the government's constant objection to
the use of such words will disrupt the flow of testimony. The aim of laywitness
testimony is to paint a picture of the defendant before, during or after the
coercive influence. Avoiding conflict surrounding the deliveryof such informa-
tion to the jury will increase its effectiveness.
A lay witness's observations of brainwashing indicia are essential to con-
vince jurors because the jurors are themselves laypersons. The defendant should
proffer the observations of disinterested parties in order to reduce the inference
of bias from relatives or friends. A disinterested party maybe any person who
came into contact with the defendant before, during, or after he was brain-
washed. The testimony of a disinterested witness will be more persuasive if,
upon first meeting the defendant, the witness believed the defendant to be under
the influence of another. The observations of lay witnesses may also be devel-
oped or supplemented through media reports.
The recent media coverage of the Malvo and Lindh cases is indicative of
layperson opinions that may reinforce expert testimony. In the case of Malvo,
his attorneys, teachers, and others who came into contact with him prior to the
sniper attacks gave descriptions of the teen prior to and during the alleged
coercive influence. Typical descriptions of Malvo included:
Lee Boyd Malvo was 'under the spell' of John Allen Muhammad, and
everyaspect of the teenager's life was controlled bythe man he looked
to as a lather figure... lalvo, a briglt, humorous teenager who had
emerged from a difficult and fatherless childhood, went through a
significant transformation after he ... met up with Muhammad, the
youth quickly changed into a methodical follower who would do
anything Muhammadr asked... e]very movement was controlled by
166. Id at Commentary 1019. The drafters probably had a history of abuse or symptoms of
mild retardation in mind when they wrote this commentary.
167. Id
168. McCullah, 514 S.E.2d at 800; Herbin v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E2d 226,231 (Va. 1998)
(admitting testimony pertaining to the attitude of the defendant on the day of the attack for a case
in which the defendant pleaded insanit).
169. See Mullis v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 919, 925 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (finding lay
witness could not testify that the victim was 'paranoid' that somebody was out to hurt him).
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Muhammad'. 'His diet was controlled, his thoughts were con-
trolled, his reading was controlled. That absolutelychanged his behav-
ior."
170
Ateacher in Washington state even related an incident of "speaking with a polite,
laughing Malvo in a school hallway when Muhammad walked in. Lee immedi-
ately became quiet, stopped talking or smiling. The word used was 'subservient.'
Like a switch had gone off.'""" According to Malvo's attorneys in recent media
reports, "Malvo's true personality is breaking through a cloud of brainwashing
... 'He was so programmed... He is nothing like he was before'... Muham-
mad indoctrinated [Malvo] and essentiallytook control of him, leading him on
a killing rampage." 72
Coverage of the Lindh case also spurred statements: "[T]here are reams of
documents to indicate that this kid has had problems since way back when....
[H]is problems were distinct, in the sense that he did things very, very strange
[sic]. He wore long robes to school when he was in high school. He was never
a person that fit in. He doesn't seem to have been a person that reallyhad a tight
grasp on reality.""" The mother of Lindh "called upon U.S. authorities to show
mercy for her son, who, she said, could have been brainwashed to fight on the
side of the Taliban."' 74
The testimony of lay witnesses such as relatives will be more effective
during sentencing. The focus during guilt/innocence must be on explaining the
defendants intent, or more specifically, the personal lack of it. It is important,
therefore, to classifyand separate properlythe different laywitnesses to establish
the best defense possible.
B. Seoxi~g Phase
Under Virginia's statutory scheme, upon a finding of guilt, "a proceeding
shall be held which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defen-
dant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment."' In the sentencing
phase, the jury has a duty to consider all the evidence relevant to sentencing,
170. Josh White,Lawyeis SayMalw Was Undrra Spd" Mut7nrdCnm/lYcbw Defee Tavn
Gak inSroer Cse, WASH. POST, June 26,2003, at B1-2, audzUeat 2003 WL 56501725.
171. Tom Jackman, Maiw Was Brairm=z Ex-Gulian Say, WASH. PosT, May 3, 2003, at
B4, audaUe at 2003 WL 20325887.
172. Josh White, Tun, NiorMalwis Envg Lawmr s Sa); WASH. POST, Sept. 18,2003, at B1,
auila&at 2003 WL 62216396.
173. The aRdlyFactor.. Its Intriewui Lasu Spem r (FOX News television broadcast,
June 16, 2002), amifatieat 2002 WL 5594627.
174. Arthur Bruzzone, Tale cfTwm Tvrnsr/, 3, at http.J/www.righttums.com/columaists/
bruzzone/ab20020101 (an. 1, 2002) (comparing the brainvwashing claims of John Walker Lindh and
Patricia Hearst).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A) (Mchie Supp. 2003).
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both favorable and unfavorable, before making its determination.07 6 Admissible
evidence mayinclude the historyand background of the defendant and anyother
factors in mitigation of the offense."7 Mitigating evidence is that which shows
'extenuating circumstances tending to explain but not excuse the commission
of a crime.' lZ Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) enumerates factors which
maybe considered in mitigation and includes as a factor committing the crime
while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
179
Brainwashing, similar to extreme mental or emotional distress, will require
psychiatric or psychological testimony.
A jury's rejection of a defense during the guilt/innocence phase does not
bar consideration of the defense in mitigation.80 For example, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") permit consideration of BWS and duress
as mitigating factors at sentencing.'81 In United Sta v ime ,'82 the defendant
introduced evidence of BWS as a component of her claim of self-defense.'83 At
trial, the Witaail defendant was required to prove that she had reasonable
grounds for believing she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harmt'84 However, under the Guidelines, she was onlyrequired to showthat the
victim's, that is the batterer's, "wrongful conduct contributed significantly to
provoking the offense behavior."' 5 Similarly, a defendant asserting a duress
defense must show "that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
have been unable to resist" the coercion.'86 Under the Guidelines, the evaluation
is based "on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions and on the extent to
which the conduct would have been less harmful under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be."1
87
The treatment of duress and BWS during sentencing may be imputed to
brainwashing. Brainwashing maybe offered as an element of an insanitydefense
176. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (Va. 1985), wt. d&ii, 475 U.S. 1099
(1986).
177. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B).
178. See Reid v. Coinmonsweakh, 506 S.E2d 787, 792 (Va. 1998) (quoting Correll v. Com-
monwealth, 352 S.E.2d 352, 360 (Va. 1987)).
179. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B).
180. See United States v. Whitetail, 956 F2d 857,863 (8th Cr. 1992) (observing that coercion
as a complete defense at trial involves proof of substantiallydifferent elements than does coercion
as a mitigator during sentencing).
181. US. SENTENciNG GUIDELINES MANUAL SS 5K2.10, 5K2.12 (2002).
182. 956 F.2d 857 (8th CAr. 1992).
183. WbitA 956 F.2d at 863.
184. Id
185. Id at 863-64; see akso U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 5K2.10 (oudining
victim's conduct that maywarramnt a downward departure); United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170,176
(5th Or. 1994) (concluding subjective evidence of susceptibility of battered woman could not be
taken into account in determining liability although it could be considered in sentencing).
186. MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.09 (1985).
187. US. SENTENaNG GUIDELINES MANUAL S 5K2.12 (2002).
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to make the defense more palatable to the judicial machinery. In such instances,
evidence which maybe prohibited during the guilt/innocence phase should be
introduced in mitigation. Justice Stevens noted in Belv Cv W88 that although the
jury was instructed to consider mitigation from the guilt phase, the jury's whole
view of that testimony was influenced by its relation to the failed defense. 9
Justice Steven's dissent strongly reinforces the importance of reintroducing
mitigation evidence in sentencing. To do so gives the jury a chance to view the
evidence in a new light. * Additionally, the rules of evidence do not govern the
introduction of novel scientific evidence during sentencing and, thus, such
evidence will not be subject to the same scrutiny as in the guilt/innocence phase.
In brainwashing cases, the defense should place equal emphasis on the
guilt/innocence and sentencing phases. A brainwashed defendant is, in effect,
not acting within his or her true personality'91 As with BWS, the defendant is
acting under an altered perception caused bypsychological abuse.192 It is irrele-
vant whether a "reasonable person" would have resisted these pressures. The
evidence should be assessed on a case-by-case basis because an exact scientific
methodology is currently lacking. The intent is not to give more weight to the
brainwashing claim but rather to reinforce that it should be considered. Because
of society's skepticism, it is necessary to ensure that the jury is reminded of its
dutyto consider all the relevant evidence. Proper consideration of the theoryin
these cases is the difference between life and death.
V. Ccu6ii n
Brainwashing is poised to take its place within the legal justice system as a
doctrinallyacceptable defense. Its predecessors- duress and BWS- have paved
the way. The first step must be compromise. It is clear from precedent that
brainwashing is unsuccessful when asserted as a complete defense. Brainwashing
is clearlya mitigating factor. Bytracing the life of the defendant, the defense will
be better able to explain whyand how the free will of the specific defendant was
overborne. In the unique case of capital murder, brainwashing is of utmost
importance because it truly is the difference between life and death.
188. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
189. Sw Bell v. Cone, 535 US. 685, 707-12 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (outlining the
egregious failure by the attorney to offer possible mitigating evidence during sentencing); Kristen
F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 127 (2002) (analyzing Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843
(2002)).
190. For example, during sentencing it maybe more appropriate to introduce evidence of the
defendant's good behavior from birth until the time of the offense.
191. S&Ne/e; 642 So. 2d at 505-06 (noting that the defendant, who was convicted of capital
murder, argued that she was brainwashed and reduced to an instrument of her husband through
his gross mental, emotional, physical and sexual abuse and as a result did everything he asked).
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